Introduction
"Africa's last colony", "the forgotten conflict" of the (western) Mediterranean, and the "frozen conflict" on the European Union's southern neighbourhood are but the most common objective euphemisms for the Western Sahara dispute, which for more than three decades has pitted the kingdom of Morocco against the Sahrawi nationalist movement, incarnated by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguiat El Hamra y de Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front). For ninety years after the Berlin Conference of 1884, Western Sahara -a stretch of desert land roughly the size of Britain -was under Spanish colonial rule. During this period, a succession of Franco-Spanish treaties delineated the territory's contemporary international borders (Omar 2008: 43) . However, the failure of the outgoing Franco regime to uphold the right of the indigenous Sahrawi people to self-determination in 1975/6, as stipulated by UN deliberations from 1965, and the instinctive expansionist claims of the Alaouite regime in Morocco, led to a prolonged confrontation typical of any tale of botched decolonisation.
Between 1965 and 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted eight resolutions calling on the administering power to "take all necessary measures" to ensure the overdue decolonization of what was then commonly referred to as the "Spanish Sahara" (Theofilopoulou 2006) . When Spain finally decided in 1974 to organize a referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people, the prospect of independence for this "Non-Self-Governing Territory" was deemed unacceptable by Morocco's late king Hassan II. In response, Morocco sought legal advice from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by way of confirming that its "southern provinces" were not terra nullius prior to Spanish colonization. civilians and 80,000 troops to march into Western Sahara in what was dubbed "the Green March" (Maghraoui 2003) . Consequently, what was clearly for Morocco a symbolic attempt at recovering the territory amounted to a declaration of war for the indigenous pro-independence movement and a grave provocation for the Sahrawis' main regional ally, Algeria. This violation of the regional order by Morocco was exacerbated by Spain's decision, with US complicity, to duck out of its responsibility by secretly concluding in Madrid in November 1975 a deal with Morocco and Mauritania, which de facto transferred administrative powers over the territory to these two countries (Mundy 2006 ).
Though in its Advisory
In the war that ensued, the Polisario army scored important early successes, notably in forcing Mauritania to relinquish its territorial claims to the southern parts of Western Sahara in 1979, and imposing itself on the Moroccan regime as an inevitable interlocutor for any ceasefire or peace negotiations (Zoubir 1990 ). Indeed, bilateral talks began in 1988 and culminated in a UNbrokered ceasefire in 1991. Though withdrawn militarily as a result of the successful erection by Morocco of an effective defensive wall ("the Berm"), 5 which consolidated its control of around 80% of the territory, the Polisario engaged in these negotiations from a relatively strong diplomatic position. Its de facto Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) had been recognized by over seventy countries and, most importantly, granted full-membership status by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984, leading to Morocco's voluntary withdrawal from that organization. Meanwhile, no state has recognized the kingdom's proclaimed sovereignty over Western Sahara (ICG 2007a) .
From 1991 onwards, the UN Security Council became firmly seized by the Western Sahara question and sought its resolution through the organization of a "free and fair referendum" on self-determination, to which both parties had agreed. 
The EU and Western Sahara: the Politics of Disengagement
Like most contemporary international conflicts in the western Mediterranean, the origins of the dispute over Western Sahara are quintessentially rooted in issues of sovereignty relating to the region's characteristically controversial processes of decolonization. But in the Saharan conflict more than others, the sense of moral responsibility rests most firmly with the former colonial power, Spain, for its recognized failure to carry through, when relinquishing the territory in 1975, the UN-prescribed task of organizing a referendum on self-determination to help settle more fairly the fate of the Sahrawi people. The protraction of the conflict for over thirty years, with considerable consequences for the immediate stakeholders individually and collectively, as well as for the international community at large (ICG 2007b) , makes the need for a positive European contribution to the resolution of the conflict even more urgent, especially considering the extant unconstructive roles played by the main relevant protagonists, namely France and Spain. As much as the genesis of the Western Sahara conflict lies in past European practices, its resolution could, now more than ever given the systemic failure of the UN process, benefit from more meaningful EU engagement.
Historically, the EU's engagement in the Western Sahara conflict has been modest at best.
Compared with its role in other UN-supervised disputes in the Mediterranean (Cyprus, IsraelPalestine, and the Balkans), the Union has generally been resigned to a backseat position, at first declaring neutrality and then, from 1988, supporting UN initiatives in a conspicuously passive manner. The EU's impotence in the Western Sahara conflict is explained fundamentally by the nature both of the conflict itself and of the EU as a foreign policy actor (Vaquer 2004: 95) .
Disunity amongst member states over the issue, coupled with the systemic ascendency of the Council over both the Commission and the European Parliament in foreign policy, is the main source of this passivity. Besides, the fact that the conflict lacks visibility and has a strong multilateral dimension, despite being legally defined as strictly bilateral, may justify the low priority it is afforded by the EU (Gillespie 2010 ).
More specifically, the active and strong interests of France and Spain in their historic links with Morocco in particular and North Africa in general have often translated into diverging individual positions, preventing the EU from adopting a common position in response to the conflict.
Instead, the only EU consensus that this situation has allowed is that of delegating to the UN exclusive responsibility for finding a diplomatic solution. This is not to suggest that other member states do not take an interest in the issue, but rather that their concerns are less structural than those of France and Spain and more related to conjunctional issues of illegal migration and the exploitation of natural resources.
Of the two most interested member states, France has traditionally been the more consistently supportive of Morocco, going as far as regularly providing Morocco with arms during the "hot" By contrast, Spain's attitude towards the conflict has been less one-sided. As the former colonial power and the de jure administrative power in the eyes of the UN (Corell 2002) Although Scandinavian pressure failed to abort the €114 million deal, it wrested -at least on paper -assurances that the population of the territory would benefit from the agreement ( 
Quid regional frameworks?
Although the dynamics of the inter-governmentalism of EU foreign policy decision-making and the bilateralism underlying Euro-Mediterranean relations have thus far manifestly favoured
Morocco's position in the conflict, it might be expected that the EU's more regionally-focused strategies would go some way towards redressing this bias. However, the added value of both the been the largest recipient of EU funds in the southern Mediterranean, including within the framework of the ENP's "Governance Facility", which rewards countries making progress in political reform. Besides the EU's naive belief in gradualism in its approach to political reform or its simple lack of commitment to it, the nature of the Moroccan political regime has also been identified as a major impediment to meaningful reform and civil society activism in this direction (Haddadi 2002; Cavatorta et al. 2006) . The role of the monarchy as the centrepiece institution in the political and economic spheres and the increasing sophistication of the Makhzen -the political and economic clientelist network of the palace -in setting the rules of the game, keep at bay any attempt at genuine political reform (Kausch 2008) . In Western Sahara, on the other hand, the EU's involvement with civil society seems limited to providing humanitarian aid to the refugees in Tindouf. Channelled through ECHO, the Commission's humanitarian aid directorate, most of the EU's aid has been implemented in coordination with UN agencies such as the WFP and the UNHCR, as well as the red cross/crescent movement. Since 1993, the Commission has donated €143 million to the refugees, which makes the EU the biggest provider of humanitarian aid to the Sahrawi refugees -a guilty acknowledgement of its inability to contribute to a settlement. and the international aid they receive has made them as efficient as any organization in a "nontribal" society (Farah 2008) . 13 Eight interviews, including one with a Polisario representative in London, were conducted with Sahrawi CSOs based mostly in the Tindouf camps. All of these interviews were conducted under the condition of anonymity to guarantee the safety of interviewees and maximize the value of information obtained.
Local CSOs and the
Morocco, for its part, is regularly praised by the international community for its implementation of advanced liberal reforms, particularly since the accession to the throne of King Mohamed VI in 1999. These changes can be seen in particular in the development of civil society, which has enjoyed a larger room for manoeuvre under the new monarch's regime. Indeed, some of the roles previously performed by the Moroccan state have now been relinquished to local NGOs, reflecting both the new liberal policy orientation and the limited resources of the public sector in
Morocco. As a result, since 1999 numerous organizations, dealing with a wide range of issues and representing a plethora of opinions and ideological convictions, have emerged. However, amongst the "red lines" drawn by the Moroccan regime for the implicit regulation of civil society activities, Western Sahara is one of the few sanctified issues, together with the constitutional role of the monarchy in the political sphere. As a result, the apparent prominence of Moroccan CSOs in a number of issues does not extend to Moroccan civil society engagement in the Western Sahara conflict, where they enjoy much less freedom. 
The activities of CSOs
The role performed by Sahrawi CSOs aims at filling the vacuum resulting from the absence of uninhibited indigenous state institutions. This means that their activities are often found to be complementary to those of the official SADR and Polisario institutions at both the social and the political levels. CSOs focused on social affairs aim not only at enhancing the well-being of Sahrawi refugees, but also at preserving a sense of community and civic responsibility amongst younger generations. Furthermore, the more political Sahrawi CSOs seek to promote their national cause outside the Maghreb by regularly interacting with their relays and counterparts, mainly in Europe.
Although they operate in a totally different context, Moroccan CSOs are on the whole no different from their Sahrawi counterparts in that they are entirely devoted to the defence of the kingdom's national cause both domestically and internationally. As much as Moroccan CSOs enjoy a fair degree of freedom in relation to issues other than the Western Sahara conflict, their remits in relation to the conflict are circumscribed by both choice and default.
With the exception of the Association of Sahrawi Engineers for Development (Association des Ingénieurs Sahraouis pour le Développement, AISD), the activities of most Sahrawi CSOs under consideration in this paper were found to have a direct bearing on the conflict. Their shared objective is to ensure that the cause of the Sahrawi people is "kept alive" within the occupied territories and, most importantly, at the international level. 17 AISD seems to be an exception to the above. Its activities concentrate on education and economic and environmental issues, and aim at creating an esprit de corps amongst Sahrawi engineers. 18 The activities organised by these engineers relate in most cases to the agricultural and environmental needs of the population in "liberated" territories. The organisation sees its contribution as laying the groundwork for a future Sahrawi state. As such, it is less concerned with political issues, and its work is accordingly less adversarial.
Like their Sahrawi counterparts, the activities of Moroccan CSOs seem to be directly linked to the Western Sahara conflict. Given the nature of the Moroccan political system, the civil society scene is characterised by a strong presence of GONGOs in all areas of civic activity. Not only do these semi-official organisations relay government policy domestically and internationally, but Prima facie, the work of the selected Sahrawi CSOs appears by and large to have a fuelling effect on the conflict, in that it contributes to entrenching the parties' respective positions. Insofar as most of the activities of these CSOs emphasise the grievances of the Sahrawi people, they can be said to have a fuelling or even holding impact. This applies to all Sahrawi CSOs under consideration in this paper, with the exception of AISD. However, the reality is not as straightforward as it may seem. Morally, the cause defended by them is largely considered by stakeholders and onlookers alike to be just. The UN defines the question as one of decolonisation to be settled through respect for the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. Therefore, for these CSOs, the grievances that are often at the centre of their work are legitimate, and defending them is no less legitimate. of the Sahrawis and the structural conditions underlying the conflict, such as the lack of democracy in Morocco. 25 The impact of their activities leans more towards the peace-building end of the spectrum as a result of the discursive alternative they offer to the official fuelling discourse and as a result of their focus on the structural causes of the conflict.
The effectiveness of CSOs
Sahrawi society, though divided by the wall splitting the Western Sahara territory into two parts, has so far displayed strong solidarity and cohesiveness towards its right to self-determination.
This appears to be true notwithstanding a number of high-profile Polisario defections to Morocco over time and the choice of some Sahrawis to accept the "Marocanité" of Western Sahara.
Besides the pursuit of statehood, this sense of community is strongly rooted in Sahrawi tradition.
Despite the inevitable existence of fault-lines between the educated and uneducated, the military and the civilian and so forth, the Sahrawis' mobilisation seems to have prevented the eruption of societal divisions deep enough to undermine their national cause. Thus, their struggle -peaceful or otherwise -has been deeply embedded in the grassroots. Even the Polisario leadership, in the face of mounting accusations of elitism, has been consciously revising its approach by allowing younger generations more opportunities and precluding the emergence of further dissidence. cases, defines the effectiveness of Sahrawi CSOs. As an interface between principles and realpolitik, the Western Sahara conflict will ultimately depend on the outcome of the interaction between these two international relations variables. Thus, working towards titling the balance more in favour of international law and morality is the shared objective of most Sahrawi CSOs.
Against this backdrop, the emergence of prominent international issues such as terrorism, migration and Islamist extremism has inhibited the work of Sahrawi CSOs in the Moroccanadministered areas, as well as their effectiveness at the international level. The increasing support of the major international players for Morocco's autonomy plan is largely informed by strategic fears over such issues. Not only has this encouraged Morocco's crackdown on the civic resistance movement in Western Sahara, but it has also emboldened its claims regarding the unfeasibility of an independent state in Western Sahara. However, all interviewed Sahrawi CSOs confirmed that the recent turn of events has strengthened rather than discouraged their resolve to continue their work, as this is seen as being part of the conflict's cyclical ups and downs.
30
In the case of Morocco, the effectiveness of CSOs is not so much a question of rootedness in society as one of proximity to the regime. Most organisations analysed in this paper are allowed to organise activities in relation to the conflict with relative liberty only because they espouse official views. However, those that choose to dissent over the government's position see their freedom of action curtailed through irregular fiat, or become outlawed altogether, as is the case with Al Adl wal Ihsane. Thus, by definition most of these Moroccan CSOs are less bottom-up movements than they are elitist. The effectiveness of their work, therefore, stems from both their interconnectedness and their relationship with the establishment. The logistical support which these CSOs enjoy is far more important than that of independent organisations such as Telquel.
31
Similarly, access to mainstream media outlets is facilitated by the regime, either explicitly or implicitly, through the pressure it puts on independent media organisations to cover their activities. 32 Independent media are usually coalescent, either by conviction, given the importance of territorial integrity in the national discourse, or for fear of stigmatisation by the Makhzen. the Moroccan government benefitted from the sympathy of certain "neo-con" policy circles (Bolton 2007) . This encouraged Morocco to formulate its autonomy proposal and to gather diplomatic support for its adoption as the new basis for negotiations with the Polisario. The "global war on terror" was a significant factor in the calculations of policy-makers within the Bush administration. By contrast, despite its increasing strategic importance for Bush's war, Algeria's categorical refusal to host the Pentagon's planned Africa Command centre (Africom) tilted the balance towards Morocco, which appeared more favourable to the idea. With Morocco, on the other hand, the EU has had ample time and opportunity to try to gear the reform process towards more genuine change. Between the Association Agreement, the Action Plan and the "advanced status", it cannot be said that there has been a lack of institutional fora for so doing. However, the EU's approach to reform in Morocco has been criticised for lacking a political component and for not dealing with Morocco's record on its own merits, but always in comparison with the region's laggards. Most bilateral roadmaps for reform actually lack specific timeframes, actors and implementation/evaluation mechanisms. This may be true of the EU's approach to political reform in its neighbours in general and not just in Morocco. But the impact of such tepid engagement on the specific issue of Western Sahara makes the case of Morocco even more pertinent.
The Role and Impact of the EU
The fact that the EU has found it difficult to surpass the omnipresence of state-sponsored Moroccan CSOs whenever the issue of engagement with civil society has arisen is further evidence of its impotence not only to alter the structural setting of CSO activity, but also to empower these organisations to claim a life of their own. Despite being one the most advanced recipients of EU money for this purpose, Morocco has managed to impose its preferred CSOs as the direct beneficiaries of EU programmes. The answer to these questions in relation to Sahrawi CSOs is relatively straightforward: the EU does not engage with civil society in the Western Sahara either through the ENP or any other policy framework. This seems to be the result of a conscious decision on the part of the EU to avoid disagreement with the Moroccan government, which provides its policies in the southern
Mediterranean with much-needed support and legitimisation. The fact that EU officials have been resigned to a backseat position, hiding behind the UN peace process, is not only an indication of their belief that this particular conflict is driven primarily by the top echelons of society, but also that the status quo is a desired situation.
The EU could engage with Sahrawi CSOs, be they of a fuelling or a peace-building nature, and help pave the way for their becoming more constructive actors in Sahrawi society regardless of issues of governance and sovereignty. However, the resilience of the EU's disengagement shows that its choice is structural and that it confirms the assumptions of the realist critique. These apply not only to the realities of the conflict, but also to the dynamics of EU foreign policy-making, which arguably remains heavily influenced by the member states. Should it become more engaged with local Sahrawi CSOs, the EU would find that there is a wide scope for the empowerment of civil society in Western Sahara, and that the task would be relatively easy to accomplish, given that the latter is well organised and has a clear identity and objectives. Thus, one could easily foresee that the liberal peace paradigm would be pertinent, if the EU was engaged with Sahrawi civil society.
Even in the case of Moroccan CSOs, the EU has refrained from availing itself of the numerous policy tools it has at its disposal to engage with civil society. The EU does not challenge the Moroccan government's position in the conflict, choosing instead to be accommodating towards its interests, as illustrated by its conclusion of a fishing agreement that covers the waters of the disputed Sahrawi territories. In fact, under the present circumstances, an EU engagement with Moroccan CSOs would fail both to reach organisations with a modicum of autonomy from the government and to have a positive impact on the transformation of the conflict. This is mainly due to the fact that the Moroccan NGOs allowed to operate freely as regards the conflict are those with an agenda that is not so different from that of the government. This situation is in turn reflective of the fact that the Moroccan polity is not as liberalised as the EU likes to believe. As a result, in the absence of effective EU pressure on Moroccan state actors to engage in meaningful democratic reform, the prospects of EU engagement with civil society with a view to conflict transformation remain dim.
EU policies are currently ineffectual when it comes to the Western Sahara conflict owing to their failure to induce structural changes in the political systems of both parties to the conflict and to carve out ways of engaging with local CSOs. However, if the EU is to use the ENP as a vehicle of conflict transformation in the Maghreb through civil society it needs tread carefully to avoid exacerbating the situation. Indeed, as stipulated by the leftist critique, EU engagement could be detrimental to conflict transformation, as the EU risks misidentifying local CSOs and/or altering their nature and effectiveness at the expense of peace. This could happen in particular in Morocco, where dissident civil society lacks visibility and is generally overshadowed by government-supported NGOs that are promoted as a result of their complicity with the state. By misidentifying its local CSO partners, the EU risks not so much discrediting their activities in the eyes of the grassroots as alienating and disillusioning Sahrawi peace partners, which would be detrimental to conflict transformation.
However, the potential for EU policies to raise the effectiveness of CSO peace-building activities in the context of the Western Sahara conflict is significant, considering its political and economic leverage over Morocco. The EU provides more financial assistance to Morocco than to any other southern Mediterranean country, and the Moroccan government clearly needs the political anchor provided by its enhanced relationship with the EU. The EU could either concentrate on the transformation of the structure in which Moroccan civil society operates by pressurising state actors to engage in far-reaching political change, or it could focus directly on the empowerment of CSOs by targeting their agency. This would fulfil the hypothesis of the liberal peace paradigm, but seems a farfetched possibility given the priority attached by the EU to the political stability of the Moroccan regime. Conversely, to attempt to achieve the same on the Sahrawi side would be less difficult for the EU, though more daunting in view of the reaction this would generate in Morocco. Such are the local constraints on EU engagement in the conflict.
Conclusion
Stemming from an incomplete decolonisation process and fuelled by belligerent rhetoric on both sides, the Western Sahara conflict is one of the most neglected conflicts in the world. Concerning the CSOs under scrutiny here, two issues appear to play a conspicuous role in hampering the resolution of the conflict. One concerns the fuelling impact which CSOs on both sides tend to have, despite the fact that some of them, mainly on the Sahrawi side, appear to contribute to the dissemination of a counter-narrative to the internationally-endorsed and unquestioned fuelling discourse of the Moroccan regime. The other is related to the strong structural, financial, operational and ideological dependence of Moroccan CSOs on the Moroccan government. This clearly has an impact on their effectiveness and their ability to contribute to conflict resolution.
Turning to the EU's engagement with civil society in Western Sahara, two of the three hypotheses tested here are validated by the evidence presented in this paper, namely the realist critique and the leftist critique. On the one hand, the EU does not engage with the grassroots on both sides and does not challenge the government's position out of its short-term interest in the political stability of the Moroccan regime. On the other hand, the EU risks engaging with, and financing, only the most visible CSOs, which, in the Moroccan case, are those closest to the official position. Finally, the hypothesis of the liberal peace paradigm remains for now far from fulfilment.
